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UNITED STATES COURT OF APPEALS 
FOR THE THIRD CIRCUIT 
_____________ 
 
No. 10-1956 
_____________ 
 
RONALD MITCHELL,  
 
                 Appellant 
 
v. 
 
KAREN GERSHEN, 1st Shift Supervisor;  
Dr. SKERL, Doctor, Cresson Infirmary;  
MARK MCDONELL, P.A., Cresson Infirmary;  
DOUGLAS BOPP, Medical Administrator at SCI Cresson 
_____________ 
 
On Appeal from the United States District Court 
for the Western District of Pennsylvania 
(No. 3-06-cv-00180) 
District Judge: Hon. Kim R. Gibson 
 
Submitted May 11, 2011 
 
Before:  SMITH, CHAGARES, and VANASKIE, Circuit Judges. 
 
(Filed May 31, 2011) 
 
____________ 
 
OPINION  
____________ 
 
CHAGARES, Circuit Judge. 
Ronald Mitchell appeals the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment to 
Physician Assistant Mark McConnell on his Eighth Amendment claim that McConnell 
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acted with deliberate indifference with regard to his foot infection.  For the reasons that 
follow, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
I.   
 
 We write for the parties‟ benefit and recite only the facts essential to our 
disposition.  In September 2005, Ronald Mitchell was a prisoner transferred to the State 
Correctional Institution in Cresson, Pennsylvania.  Mitchell had a medical history of 
diabetes and neuropathy and, at the time of transfer, had an ulcer on his right foot.  On 
January 11, 2006, Mitchell complained to Physician Assistant Mark McConnell that his 
foot was giving off a rotting-flesh odor.  McConnell, not believing there were any signs 
of infection, conducted a foot soak on Mitchell.  On January 17 and 24, Mitchell again 
brought the odor to McConnell‟s attention and McConnell proceeded with a foot soak.  
On January 26, Mitchell saw Dr. Skerl who ordered a culture of the ulcer and 
subsequently determined that Mitchell needed surgery.  Following surgery, on February 
13, Mitchell‟s medical results showed that his foot was infected with Methicillin-
Resistant Staphylococcus Aureus (“MRSA”).  Mitchell was then treated with antibiotics.   
 On August 14, 2006, Mitchell filed suit pro se against several prison officials, 
alleging a claim under 42 U.S.C. § 1983 for a violation of the Eighth Amendment due to 
the inadequate and delayed treatment of his foot infection.  On February 11, 2010, a 
Magistrate Judge issued a Report and Recommendation (“R&R”) that summary judgment 
should be granted to the remaining defendant McConnell based, inter alia, on the fact that 
Mitchell could not carry his burden of proof to show deliberate indifference without an 
expert witness.   Despite Mitchell‟s objections to the R&R, the District Court adopted the 
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Magistrate Judge‟s recommendation and granted summary judgment to McConnell.  
Mitchell filed a timely appeal.
1
 
II. 
  Our review of the District Court‟s grant of summary judgment is plenary, and we 
apply the same legal standard as it should have.  Vitalo v. Cabot Corp., 399 F.3d 536, 542 
(3d Cir. 2005).  A party is entitled to summary judgment “if the pleadings, the discovery 
and disclosure materials on file, and any affidavits show that there is no genuine issue as 
to any material fact and that the movant is entitled to judgment as a matter of law.”  Fed. 
R. Civ. P. 56(c).  In conducting our analysis, we must view the record in the light most 
favorable to Mitchell, and must draw all reasonable inferences in his favor.  See Vitalo, 
399 F.3d at 542.  To defeat summary judgment, however, Mitchell must “produce 
admissible evidence containing „specific facts showing that there is a genuine issue for 
trial.‟”  Id. at 542 (quoting Fed. R. Civ. P. 56(e)). 
III. 
 The Eighth Amendment, through its prohibition on cruel and unusual punishment, 
mandates that prison officials not act deliberately indifferent to a prisoner‟s serious 
medical needs by denying or delaying medical care.  Estelle v. Gamble, 429 U.S. 97, 104 
(1976).  In order to sustain a constitutional claim, a prisoner must make (1) an 
“objective” showing that the prisoner‟s medical needs were sufficiently serious and (2) a 
                                              
1
 The District Court had jurisdiction under 28 U.S.C. § 1331, and we have jurisdiction 
under 28 U.S.C. § 1291. 
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“subjective” showing that the prison official acted with a sufficiently culpable state of 
mind.  Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 F.3d 492, 499 (3d Cir. 2002).   
A medical need is considered “serious” when it is “one that has been diagnosed by 
a physician as requiring treatment or one that is so obvious that a lay person would easily 
recognize the necessity for a doctor‟s attention.”  Monmouth County Corr. Inst. Inmates 
v. Lanzaro, 834 F.2d 326, 347 (3d Cir. 1987) (quotations omitted).  We have recognized 
that the “seriousness of an inmate‟s medical need may also be determined by reference to 
the effect of denying the particular treatment.”  Id.   
“To act with deliberate indifference to serious medical needs is to recklessly 
disregard a substantial risk of serious harm.”  Giles v. Kearney, 571 F.3d 318, 330 (3d 
Cir. 2009).  A prison official can be found liable if the official knows of and disregards 
an excessive risk to an inmate‟s health.  Farmer v. Brennan, 511 U.S. 825, 837 (1994).   
“[T]he official must both be aware of facts from which the inference could be drawn that 
a substantial risk of serious harm exists, and [] must also draw the inference.”  Id.  The 
official‟s knowledge of a risk can be shown indirectly by circumstantial evidence.  Beers-
Capitol v. Whetzel, 256 F.3d 120, 131 (3d Cir. 2001).  Deliberate indifference, however, 
must entail more than mere allegations of malpractice.  Monmouth County Corr. Inst. 
Inmates, 834 F.2d at 346.  “Where a prisoner has received some medical attention and the 
dispute is over the adequacy of the treatment, federal courts are generally reluctant to 
second guess medical judgments and to constitutionalize claims which sound in state tort 
law.”  United States ex rel. Walker v. Fayette County, 599 F.2d 573, 575 n.2 (3d Cir. 
1979) (quotations omitted); see also Estelle, 429 U.S. at 106 (“[A] complaint that a 
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physician has been negligent in diagnosing or treating a medical condition does not state 
a valid claim of medical mistreatment under the Eighth Amendment.”).     
 Mitchell‟s main contention is that the District Court erred in granting summary 
judgment by mandating a requirement that he present an expert witness to satisfy his 
Eighth Amendment claim.  Mitchell maintains that he is not required to present an expert 
witness and that the District Court conflated his constitutional claim with the 
requirements of a medical malpractice claim.  Further, Mitchell argues that an expert 
witness is not necessary to establish that he had a serious medical need because 
complications with diabetes and exposure to MRSA are known as serious medical needs.  
 Mitchell misinterprets the District Court‟s decision.  The District Court 
acknowledged that generally plaintiffs are not required to provide an expert witness in a 
deliberate indifference case, but, in this case, Mitchell could not carry his burden of proof 
without an expert witness.  Appendix at 14.  We have recognized that “[i]n some 
situations in which the seriousness of injury or illness would be apparent to a lay person, 
expert testimony would not be required.”  Boring v. Kozakiewicz, 833 F.2d 468, 473 (3d 
Cir. 1987).  We agree with the District Court that this is not one of those cases.   In order 
to sustain his deliberate indifference claim based on his objection to the type of diagnosis 
and treatment he received, Mitchell needs to provide the jury with expert testimony 
because the ability to diagnose a foot infection and determine the proper treatment and 
medication protocol is not readily apparent to lay persons.  Similarly, Mitchell needs to 
provide the fact finder with expert testimony as to the seriousness of the medical 
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consequences and effects of MRSA
2
 and foot ulcers.  See Montgomery v. Pinchak, 294 
F.3d 492, 504 (3d Cir. 2002) (noting that the seriousness of diseases, unlike broken legs 
or bullet wounds, are not obvious and ascertainable to a lay person and, hence, require 
expert testimony); Boring, 833 F.2d at 473-74 (expert testimony needed to determine if 
injury to ulnar nerve or knee disorder was serious).
3
   
Notwithstanding Micthell‟s lack of expert testimony, we agree with the District 
Court that Mitchell failed to meet his burden of showing a genuine issue of material fact 
to sustain summary judgment.  Mitchell has not provided evidence that either McConnell 
knew of the inadequacy of his care and disregarded the risk to his safety, nor has he 
presented circumstantial evidence in which an inference could be drawn that a reasonable 
person could conclude that McConnell was aware of the substantial risk to Mitchell‟s 
health.  The record shows that McConnell met with Mitchell on a weekly basis, provided 
treatments of foot soaks as directed by Dr. Skerl, and had Mitchell examined by Dr. Skerl 
who never recommended antibiotic treatment.  At best, a fact finder could conclude that 
McConnell was negligent in failing to detect symptoms and diagnose the infection.  
Mitchell has failed, however, to present any evidence that McConnell acted with 
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 This is particularly true in light of the fact that we have previously recognized that 
“most MRSA skin infections can be treated without antibiotics by draining the sores.”  
Kaucher v. County of Bucks, 455 F.3d 418, 421 (3d Cir. 2006).   
3
 Mitchell also contends that it would be inappropriate for an expert witness to testify as 
to whether McConnell acted with deliberate indifference.  We agree.  However, there is 
no indication that the District Court was requiring such testimony.  Mitchell was only 
required to provide expert testimony showing how and why McConnell‟s treatments or 
lack of treatments contributed to his harms such that a fact finder could conclude that his 
actions amounted to deliberate indifference.   
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deliberate indifference.   Accordingly, we will affirm the District Court‟s grant of 
summary judgment on Mitchell‟s Eighth Amendment claim.   
IV. 
 For the foregoing reasons, we will affirm the judgment of the District Court.   
